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THE AUTOMOBILE PRESUMPTION IN THE
NEW YORK NARCOTICS LAW
MICHAEL EDWARD ROSE*
N EW York Penal Law section 220.25 provides:
1. The presence of a controlled substance in an automobile, other than a public omni-
bus, is presumptive evidence of knowing possession thereof by each and every person
in the automobile at the time such controlled substance was found; except that such
presumption does not apply (a) to a duly licensed operator of an automobile who is at
the time operating it for hire in the lawful and proper pursuit of his trade, or (b) to any
person in the automobile if one of them, having obtained the controlled substance and
not being under duress, is authorized to possess it and such controlled substance is in the
same container as when he received possession thereof, or (c) when the controlled
substance is concealed upon the person of one of the occupants.'
In short, the law provides that, except under certain circumstances, the
mere presence of any controlled substance in a private automobile is
sufficient evidence to convict every occupant of the automobile of know-
ing possession of the substance. For example, in People v. Anonymous,.2
a young man was arrested when a few seconal tablets were found on the
floor of the car he was driving. His mother testified that the pills bad
fallen out of her purse on a prior trip and he was acquitted because the
presumption had been overcome by "'substantial evidence to the con-
trary.' ,, But suppose that, instead of his mother, an acquaintance (in
unlawful possession) had lost the pills on a prior trip and the young man
and his present passengers were charged with possession. Would it be
likely that the real violator would be found, or would testify?
Punishment on this theory of liability is very similar to the tort con-
cept of res ipsa loquitur where there is a possibility of joint or successive
tortfeasors.4 But the plaintiff in a civil suit need only preponderate, while
* B., City College of New York; M.S. and E.EJE., University of Southern California;
J.D., cum laude, Loyola University School of Law, Los Angeles.
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 220.25 (McKinney Supp. 1973). The statute is discussed at length
in Comment, Possession of Dangerous Drugs in a Car-New York's Criminal Presumption
Statute, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 188 (1971).
2. 65 Misc. 2d 288, 317 N.Y.S2d 237 (Dist. Ct 1970).
3. Id. at 289, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 239. See People v. Hargrove, 33 App. Div. 2d 539, 304
N.Y.S.2d 574 (1st Dep't 1969) (presumption rebutted after policeman testified that the de-
fendant passenger had thrust an envelope, similar to an envelope containing marijuana, into
the auto seat; defendant showed he was a hitchhiker and had previously refused marijuana
from the driver).
4. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). For a general discussion
of res ipsa loquitur see W. Prosser, Torts §§ 39-40 (4th ed. 1971).
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the "plaintiff" in a criminal case must prove his case beyond a reasonable
doubt. The criminal defendant, unlike his civil counterpart, supposedly
is protected by a host of constitutional rights.5
Prior to the Court's decision in Leary v. United States,' statutory
presumptions survived the due process hurdle because the Court felt a
rational connection existed between the proved fact and the presumed
fact,7 or because the legislature could have made the conduct a crime
anyway,8 or because it would be easier for the defendant to disprove the
presumed fact than it would be for the prosecution to prove it.0 In Leary
5. Where the elements of the crime include both knowledgeable and unlawful possession
of a controlled substance, the effect of requiring the defendant to prove that he was not in
possession of a few little white pills when he was not even aware of their existence, is some-
what unjust. However, the Supreme Court has permitted the conviction of a defendant with-
out the introduction of any evidence on some of the elements required for violation. See Mr.
justice Black's dissent in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970):
"Few if any decisions of this Court have done more than this one today to undercut and
destroy the due process safeguards the federal Bill of Rights specifically provides to protect
defendants charged with crime in United States courts. Among the accused's Bill of Rights'
guarantees that the Court today weakens are:
"1. His right not to be compelled to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury;
"2. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
"3. The right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself;
"4. The right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
"5. The right to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
"6. The right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for his defense;
"7. The right to counsel; and
"8. The right to trial by an impartial jury." Id. at 425 (Black, J. dissenting).
6. 395 U.S. 6 (1969). For a collection of prior cases see id. at 32-33 n.56.
7. This test logically follows from the application of a straight due process standard. E.g.,
Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
8. This rationale is now considered irrelevant. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 36.
Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Turner is to similar effect: "Congress can undoubtedly create
crimes and define their elements, but it cannot under our Constitution even partially remove
from the prosecution the burden of proving at trial each of the elements it has defined. The
fundamental right of the defendant to be presumed innocent is swept away to precisely the
extent judges and juries rely upon . . . statutory presumptions .... " 396 U.S. at 429-30
(Black, J., dissenting).
9. Of the three tests suggested, this test comes closest to the tort analogy. See note 4
supra and accompanying text. While the application of tort concepts in criminal law Is some-
times very helpful, it is not always appropriate. The res ipsa concept permits a plaintiff to
come into court, prove injury, and then shift the burden of proof to the defendant because as
between plaintiff and defendant, the latter is in a better position to explain the events leading
up to the accident. In criminal law the burden should pass to the defendant only after his
guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and then only if he desires It. Res ipsa
is a doctrine of implied guilt and robs the defendant of the presumption of innocence to
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the defendant was convicted of having knowingly possessed imported
marihuana illegally. The government had had the benefit of a mandatory
presumption requiring the jury to find that if the defendant possessed
marihuana illegally, the marihuana was imported and he had knowledge
of its importation.'0 The Court found that there was sufficient marihuana
grown domestically so that it could not be said with substantial assurance
that one in possession of marihuana knew that he possessed imported
marihuana (regardless of whether the marihuana was in fact of the
domestic or imported variety)" and hence the presumption had to be
regarded as irrational, arbitrary, and therefore violative of due process.' -
Since the Court found the knowledge presumption unconstitutional under
the "substantial assurance" requirement, it expressly declined to decide
whether the presumption had to be valid beyond a reasonable doubt."3
The Court came closer to the reasonable doubt standard in Turner v.
United States,'4 when it upheld a presumption of the knowledgeable pos-
session of imported heroin because it had no reasonable doubts that
heroin was not produced domestically. The jury had been instructed
that "it was the sole judge of the facts and the inferences to be drawn
therefrom, [and] that all elements of the crime must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt .... ."" Thus, if the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had knowingly possessed imported heroin, with
which he is entitled. A defendant no longer so protected is forced to take the witness stand
to explain his actions, and this too is a violation of his constitutional guarantees.
10. Then 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964), repealed by Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
§ 1101(a) (2), 84 Stat. 1291.
11. 395 U.S. at 52-53.
12. "[A] criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,'
and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to
depend." Id. at 36.
13. Id. at 36 & n.64. The exact meaning of "substantial assurance" is not so readily
ascertainable. A rational connection is an inference that vanishes upon the introduction of
opposing evidence, Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910), and does
not have the effect of evidence that prevails unless the other party successfully rebuts it by a
preponderance of the evidence. Western & AUt. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 US. 639, 642 (1929).
A substantial assurance is something more than a rational connection (which in turn is some-
thing less than a preponderance) and something less than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Since the presumed fact must more likely than not flow from the proved fact with substan-
tial assurance, it would seem that the requirement is at least a mere preponderance. At least
one court has in fact held that the standard is the civil standard of preponderance of the
evidence. United States v. Vallejo, 312 F. Supp. 244, 248 (SM.N.Y. 1970), afPd sub nom.
United States v. Liguori, 438 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1971).
14. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
15. Id. at 406.
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or without the aid of the presumption, the conviction was valid. Since
the Court had no reasonable doubts that the heroin was imported, it
reasoned the jury certainly could not have had such doubts.'0 It was,
therefore, not unreasonable for the jury to find that the defendant also
"knew" the heroin was imported.
But what is the standard against which a presumption is measured?
If the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt it is certainly also
substantially assured. The Court may be saying that as long as the jury
hears and considers all the evidence presented to it and concludes that the
defendant is guilty of all the elements of the crime (having heard no
evidence on some of the elements) beyond a reasonable doubt, the pre-
sumption is valid. Juries, however, have always been certain beyond a
reasonable doubt,17 and if the Court had meant to go no further than
Leary, the Turner opinion was not necessary. While the Turner Court
said that the jury did not have a reasonable doubt, the Court also said
that it had no reasonable doubts about the presumption. The Court ap-
plied a reasonable doubt standard to the presumption and it does not
normally apply a standard it does not intend to be applied. Since a de-
fendant has a right to have each element proven beyond a reasonable
doubt,18 logic demands that the connection between the proved and pre-
sumed facts also be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.' But
some courts have not necessarily seen it that way.20
The New York Court of Appeals has held specifically that a presump-
tion need not establish the ultimate fact beyond a reasonable doubt.2 '
16. Id. at 407.
17. In People v. Russo, 278 App. Div. 98, 103 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 303 N.Y.
673, 102 N.E.2d 834 (1951), the court applied the rational connection standard subsequently
disapproved by Leary and noted: "It does not . . . change the burden of proof. Tile people
must at all times sustain the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. It, in substance, enacts that, certain facts being proved, the jury may regard them,
if believed, as sufficient to convict, in the absence of explanation or contradiction." Id. at 103,
103 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
18. E.g., Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 89 (1949) ; see United States v. Peeples,
377 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Gibson, 310 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1962).
19. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 Stan. L.
Rev. 341, 349-50 (1970).
20. E.g., Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 436 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1970): "Use of such
inferences is permissible in criminal cases at least when it can be said beyond a reasonable
doubt, and perhaps when it is more likely than not, that the presumed fact flows from the
proved fact." Id. at 1294 (citation omitted).
The Second Circuit has used the Leary "substantial assurance" standard even after Turner.
United States v. Liguori, 438 F.2d 663, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1971).
21. People v. Kirkpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 17, 25, 295 N.E.2d 753, 757, 343 N.Y.S.2d 70, 76,
appeal dismissed, 94 S. Ct. 283 (1973).
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All that need be established is that the "probabilities," based upon ex-
perience and proof, justify a presumption;2- "[o]therwise, persons
charged with crime could be required unfairly to prove their inno-
cence .... " Upon whose experience are these probabilities to be based?
Not on the experience of a juror, for his decision cannot be based upon a
probability; he must be free of all reasonable doubts. It must then be
based upon the experience of the legislators and jurists who create pre-
sumptions. Thus, a juror may be permitted to find a fact proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, because a legislator or jurist, reaching into the jury
box, found it within the probabilities.
The force of this conclusion should be evident quite apart from the profound sub-
versiveness of a view that would countenance our telling juries in one breath that
proof of all elements must be beyond a reasonable doubt while effectively saying in
the next breath that the burden on some or all elements may actually be a good deal
less substantial .... This would not be the first time, however, that the usually con-
structive and mutually inspiriting [sic] collaboration between judges and juries has
been undermined by the use of fictions. 24
Realizing that there may have been some confusion, the Supreme Court
attempted to resolve the problems in Barnes v. United States.'- The trial
court had instructed the jurors that if the mail in question had been
stolen recently, they could infer that the defendant possessed it with
knowledge of its theft. (The defendant had cashed checks stolen from
the mails, and had deposited them in his own account.) The defendant
argued that the inference could not be shown beyond a reasonable doubt,
and therefore was invalid.
The Court first noted that if the "reasonable doubt" and the "more
likely than not" standards were met, then an inference "dearly accords
with due process." 26 As regards the former, the Court noted that if "the
evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational
juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt!rn the reason-
able doubt standard is met. The Court then continued:
[T]he challenged instruction only permitted the inference of guilt from unexplained
[or unsatisfactorily explained] possession of recently stolen property .... On the basis
22. Id. at 24, 295 N.E.2d at 757, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 75. See United States v. Vallejo, 312 F.
Supp. 244, 246 (SJ)-N.Y. 1970), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Liguori, 438 F.2d 663 (2d
Cir. 1971); People v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278, 286, 277 N.E.2d 396, 400-01, 327 N.YS.2d 342,
349 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972).
23. 32 N.Y.2d at 24, 295 N.E.2d at 757, 343 N.YS.2d at 75.
24. United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776, 784 & n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Frankel, 3.).
25. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
26. Id. at 843.
27. Id.
1974]
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of this evidence alone common sense and experience tell us that petitioner must have
known or been aware of the high probability that the checks were stolen.28
The most disturbing aspect of this passage is what has been omitted.
The Court says that "common sense and experience tell us that" the
petitioner should have had knowledge that the goods were stolen. The
Court does not say that common sense and experience make us substan-
tially assured that the presumed fact flows, more likely than not, from
the proved fact. For common sense can also be used to determine if there
is a rational connection between the presumed and proved facts; and
what is sometimes referred to as common sense is often relied upon in
determining if a statute or a presumption is rational and not arbitrary.28
So that none might misinterpret its reasoning the Court, in a footnote,30
quoted the Tot v. United States"' standard, namely, that it is permissible
to shift the burden of going forward with evidence when there is only
a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed or
inferred.2
Therefore, to determine the constitutionality of the automobile pre-
sumption we must ascertain whether, following Barnes, there is a rational
connection between the presence of a controlled substance in an auto-
mobile and each person in the automobile having knowledge of the
presence of, and the ability to identify, the substance.8 3 To complete the
28. Id. at 845 (footnote and emphasis omitted). Unless a presumption is mandatory, a
presumption or inference either shifts the burden of proof or the burden of going forward to
the defendant. He, therefore, is placed in a position where he must satisfactorily explain his
innocence. The Court generally has left this unsaid and perhaps wisely so. By expressing It,
the Court would admit that there are certain circumstances where the defendant Is not pre-
sumed innocent, and that something less than a reasonable doubt is required to negate the
presumption. justice Black would be very troubled. See note S supra and accompanying text.
29. It is not contended that common sense should not be relied upon in determining the
validity of statutes and presumptions. Nor is it suggested that, under either the Leary test
or a more stringent reasonable doubt test, an inference of guilt would not be permissible
where the defendant cashes several checks made out to several parties, none of whom he
knows. The Barnes Court, however, enunciated a general rule for presumptions, finding that
the common sense and experience of legislators is a sufficient alternative to the reasonable
doubts of the jury. This is at best questionable.
30. 412 U.S. at 846 n.11.
31. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
32. Id. at 467.
33. This is the Barnes standard, the minimum that is constitutionally permissible. New
York courts may increase, but cannot decrease, the burden upon the state. Since it would
take substantially more evidence to overcome a presumption involving commercial quantities
of narcotics than it would if small quantities were involved, New York courts might require
a stricter standard to test the constitutionality of a presumption involving the latter. This Is
ironic since one could make a stronger showing under Leary with commercial quantities.
"[Olne must look to the ease with which a presumption may be rebutted. If it is easy for
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picture, analysis must also be made using the more stringent Leary
standards 4
It is very unlikely that the owner of commercial quantities of con-
trolled substances would permit anyone in the car with him who was not
in some way connected with these substances 35 Thus, both tests easily
uphold the presumption in this situation. However, if the controlled
substances are in the glove compartment, attached beneath the car, or in
the trunk, the owner might not be as worried about a person being in the
car who is not associated with his business as he would if the substances
were in plain view. In an analogous situation the legislature declined
to apply the presumption "when the controlled substance is concealed
upon the person of one of the occupants.137 In the above hypotheticals
one could make a strong argument that it is not more likely than not
that a mere passenger would be in knowing "possession" of the drug;38
however, the opposite conclusion is not an irrational one.
When the subject is no longer commercial quantities, it becomes sig-
nificantly more difficult to determine if a passenger (assuming the driver
is a possessor) also would be in knowing "possession." Here, the source
of the "common knowledge and experience" the average defendant is
charged with might be the determinative factor and a different result
could be reached for each drug considered. Given the prevalence of drug
use among many groups of American society today, and the acceptance of
at least some drug use by non-users, it is likely that a person may not
the defendant to rebut, then the presumption is a tolerable burden ... . (A] plausible re-
buttal may very well place the burden and going forward again on the prosecution if it is to
... establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Kirkpatrick, 32 N.YZd 17, 25, 295
N.E.2d 753, 738, 343 N.YS.2d 70, 77 (1973) (citations omitted).
34. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
35. "We do not believe that persons transporting dealership quantities of contraband are
likely to go driving about with innocent friends or that they are likely to pick up strangers.
We do not doubt that this can and does in fact occasionally happen, but because we find it
more reasonable to believe that the bare presence in the vehicle is culpable, we think it
reasonable to presume culpability in the direction which [sic] the proven facts already point.
Since the presumption is an evidentiary one, it may be offset by any evidence, including the
testimony of the defendant, which would negate the defendant's culpable involvement."
Temporary State Commission to Evaluate the Drug Laws, Interim Report, 1972 N.Y. Legis.
Doc. No. 10, at 69 [hereinafter cited as Interim Report].
36. See People v. Terra, 303 N.Y. 332, 102 N.E.2d 576 (1951), appeal dismissed, 342 US.
938 (1952) (presumption that all those in a room in which a machine gun was found have
knowing possession of said gun); People v. Russo, 278 App. Div. 98, 103 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1st
Dep't), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 673, 102 N.E.2d 834 (1951) (revolver in an automobile).
37. N.Y. Penal Law § 220.25(1) (c) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
38. See United States v. Thomas, 453 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975
(1972) (narcotics taped beneath a vehicle is insufficient without more to establish the guilt
of a passenger for transporting).
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be in criminal possession of a drug himself although in the presence of
a person who is. It is also reasonable that a prior passenger may have
accidentally lost or forgotten some of his drugs in another's car, or that
a person hitchhiking may very well be unaware of a drug's presence in
the car in which he is riding. If the drug were in common usage and were
concealed in some manner,3 9 it would not be rational to presume knowing
possession by all in the car. If the drug were not concealed it may be
argued (with probable success in many courts) that it is likely and at
least rational that all in the car were in possession (at least if they were
all in the same seat, front or back), but is it rational to presume all were
in knowledgeable possession? Is it not arguably reasonable to assume
that most people seeing a little while pill might mistake it for an aspirin?
Considering the overabundance of multicolored pills in the American
medicine cabinet, it would be most irrational to charge a person with
knowledge of a substance's presence unless it was in some way proven
that the person was familiar with the substance. 41
The section has other constitutional problems. It provides in part that
the presumption does not apply when one of the people in the car is
authorized to possess the controlled substance, and the drug is in its
original container.4 Often when someone is under medication and has
to take doses of different medicines throughout the day he will place a
sufficient number of pills in a container and leave the rest at home. For
the protection of his friends this person cannot ride in a car with others.
New York's Temporary State Commission to Evaluate the Drug Laws
concluded that this was irrational and recommended that the words
"in the same container as when he received possession thereof" be elim-
inated.42 The requirement of the original container surpasses reason and
the limits of any standard of due process the Supreme Court may con-
ceive.
An on-duty cab driver in his car, in which a controlled substance is
found, is not burdened by the presumption. 43 In light of the present en-
ergy crisis and lack of gasoline, this privilege given the cab driver may
invidiously discriminate against members of car pools, hitchhikers, and
39. Cf. Interim Report 69: "We believe, and find, that it is rational and logical to pre-
sume that all occupants of a vehicle are aware of, and culpably involved in, possession of
dangerous drugs found abandoned or secreted in a vehicle when the quantity of the drug is
such that it would be extremely unlikely for an occupant to be unaware of its presence."
40. Again, the standard here may well vary with the identity of the substance. For
example, it may be easier to show that a person "knew" what marihuana was, as opposed to
a seconal tablet.
41. N.Y. Penal Law § 220.25(1) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
42. Interim Report 24, 77.
43. N.Y. Penal Law § 220.26(l) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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the drivers of other private vehicles. That is, the purpose of the classifi-
cation was to permit cab drivers to practice their trade without becom-
ing liable for the criminal violations of a customer; the effect of the
classification is to treat groups similarly situated in a significantly differ-
ent manner; the distinction is arguably rational because the cab driver
must take all customers," while a private car operator need not, but with
a gasoline shortage the freedom once experienced by the private operator
may be diminished.
In short, the automobile presumption in the New York drug law pre-
sents severe constitutional difficulties. Given the new harsher penalties
for drug use and possession in New York, it is imperative that the New
York Legislature reconsider the wisdom of this presumption.
44. E.g., N.Y.C. Charter & Admin. Code § 436-2.0(f) (24) (b) (1971).
